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FLORIDA TAX REVIEW 
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WHY THE BUFFETT-GATES GIVING PLEDGE REQUIRES 
LIMlT ATION OF THE EST ATE TAX 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
by 
Edward A. Zelinsky• 
Abstract 
The Buffett-Gates Giving Pledge, under which 
wealthy individuals promise to leave a majority of their 
assets to charity, is an admirable effort to encourage 
philanthropy. However, the Pledge requires us to confront 
the paradox that the federal estate tax charitable deduction 
is unlimited while the federal income tax charitable 
deduction is capped. If a Giving Pledger leaves his wealth to 
charity, the federal fisc loses significant revenue since the 
Pledger thereby avoids federal estate taxation as charitable 
bequests are deductible without limit for federal estate tax 
purposes. Despite its laudable qualities, the Giving Pledge is 
a systematic (albeit inadvertent) threat to the estate tax base. 
The Giving Pledge requires the amendment of the 
federal estate tax to restrict an estate's charitable deduction 
to a percentage of the estate, just as the income tax 
charitable deduction is limited to a percentage of the 
taxpayer's income. In this fashion, the sensible compromise 
embedded in the income tax charitable deduction would be 
carried over to the federal estate tm: to simultaneously 
encourage charitable giving while ensuring that all large 
estates pay some federal estate tm. 
The Giving Pledge need not be the death knell of the 
estate tax. It should instead be the catalyst to reform the tat 
by limiting the estate tax charitable deduction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of the Giving Pledge 1 is a propitious development in 
contemporary America, an admirable effort to encourage philanthropy. The 
Giving Pledge is the effort by Warren Buffett and Bill Gates, Jr. to encourage 
their fellow billionaires to promise to "give the majority of their wealth to 
philanthropic causes or charitable organizations either during their lifetimc-
on in their will."~ However, there is considerable tension between the Givin!! 
Pledge and another Buffett-Gates project, the preservation of the federal 
estate tax.3 If a Giving Pledger leaves his wealth to charity, the federal fisc 
loses significant revenue since the Pledger thereby avoids federal estate 
taxation4 as charitable bequests are deductible without limit for federal estate 
tax purposes. Despite its laudable qualities, the Giving Pledge is a 
systematic, albeit unintended, threat to the federal estate tax base. 
The Giving Pledge thus requires us to confront the paradox that the 
federal estate tax charitable deduction is unlimited while the federal income 
tax charitable deduction5 includes detailed limitations which restrict the 
proportion of an individual taxpayer's income which may be deducted as a 
I. THE GIVING PLEDGE, http://givingpledge.org (last accessed Jan. 6, 2014). 
2. Frequently Asked Questions, THE GIVING PLEDGE, http://givingpledge 
.org/faq.aspx (last updated Feb. 20, 2014). 
3. Signers of Responsible Wealth Statement in Support of Estate Tax, AM. 
FOR TAX REFORM, Dec. 11, 20 l 2, http://www.americansfortaxfaimess.org/files 
/Signers-of-Responsible-Wealth-Statement-in-Support-of-Estate-Tax-12-11 - 12-1030 
-am.pdf. Bill Gates, Sr. has been particularly outspoken in support of estate taxation. 
However, Bill Gates, Jr. has made clear that he, too, supports the federal estate tax. 
Dan Farber, A New Comedy Act: Buffe11 and Gates, CBS NEWS, May 4, 2009, 
http://\nnv.cbsnews.com/news/a-new-comedy-act-buffett-and-gates . 
. 4. The federal gift tax backstops the federal estate tax. All of my 
observat10ns ~~out the federal estate tax apply to the federal gift tax, as well. For 
ease of expos1t10n, l generally refer only to the federal estate tax. However, such 
references also encompass the gift tax and should be so understood. 
5. I.R.C. § 170. 




Through these limits the • 
c . . , income tax h · deduction unplements the ethic that everyone-eve ta c antable 
. . h . n xpayers who d 
their entire incomes to c anty-should pay some fed 1 . evote 
. l l era income tax ·h·t 
the Code s1mu taneous y countenances the total a •ct , "" 1 e 
• · vo1 ance of th t d 
estate tax via charitable bequests. · e e era! 
The central argument of this Article is that the G' . 
requires the amendment of the federal estate tax t . ivmg Pledge 
. o restnct an estate's 
charitable deduction to a percentage of the estate 1·ust h . d d · · 1· · d • as t e mcome tax charitable e ucl!on 1s 1m1te to a percentage of the taxp , . 
. . ayer s income The 
limits of the income tax charitable deduction embody a sen 'bl · . 
• · . h · si e compromise 
which reqmres every c antable donor to pay some income ta 'f 
l f I . . . h . . x even 1 he gives al o 11s income to c arity. This approach should be cam· d th 1 . . e over to e 
estate tax charitable deduction so that every estate8 large eno gh t • 
I. b'I ' .11 u o trigger f edera! estate 1a 1 1t~ w1 pay. s~me estate tax, even if that estate devolves in 
its entirety upon charitable rec1p1ents . 
. Ideally, the fed~ral estate tax should incorporate the limits the Code 
today imposes on the mcome tax deductibility of charitable contributions. 
Alternatively, less robust restrictions could be fashioned for the estate tax 
charitable deduction such as a deduction limit only applicable to bequests to 
private foundations or to certain private foundations. 
The Giving Pledge need not be the death knell of the federal estate 
tax. The Giving Pledge should, instead, be the catalyst to refonn the tax by 
limiting the estate tax charitable deduction. 
I come to these conclusions by revisiting important issues which 
have generated much fine legal scholarship and public debate: Why pennit 
charitable tax deductions? Why levy an estate tax? Ultimately, the argument 
for the limitations of the income tax charitable deduction is the desirability of 
compromise among the contending rationales for and against a charitable 
deduction. The income tax charitable deduction is con\·entionally defended 
either as ( 1) an incentive for the donor to contribute his resources to charity, 
or (2) as a recognition that the charitable donor sacrifices personal resources 
by relinquishing control of donated funds and consequently reduces by such 
donations his capacity to pay personal income tax. Counterbala~cing these 
considerations are the public fisc's need for revenue, the behe~ that all 
taxpayers should contribute something for the governmental services they 
utilize, and the view that charitable donations may in important respects 
6.1.R.C. § l70(b). . .. . lh ifl 1ax 
_ 7. Since_ the federal gi_fl _tax backstops th~ federal ~~'.e ~;12 (:n1imited 
charitable deduction should be l1m1ted tn the same "ay. See I. § 
gift tax charitable deduetion). . . . onl 10 bequests to private 8. However if the deducuon hn11t were to apply y. •i· h estates wm 
' Id ·11 'd II federal estate ta\ t sue foundations, large estates cou stt avot. a . h •iabk deduction limit 
devoted solely to public charities. I d1s~uss 111/ra a c an 
applying only to bequests to private foundations. 
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. ersonal consumption by the donor. Allowing but limiting th 
constitute P d • . e 
. t , charitable deduction balances these conten mg considerations by income ax . . 
. • II charitable donors to pay some income tax, even if they 
requmng a . C d ' I . 
contribute all of their incomes _to ch~nty. The d o_ e s oflwer deduct10n limit 
fi t 
•butions to nonqualifymg private foun at1ons re ects an assessment 
or conn d h · · I 
h • t ]y controlled and privately supporte c ant1es are ess worthy of a t at pnva e . . . . . 
, bsidy than are public chanties. This hm1t also acknowledges that 
tax su d · I k 
d f ons to such nonqualifying private foun at10ns oo more consumption-ona 1 . . • h ·1 'fi like than do donations to public chant1es wh1c enta1 more sacn ice and less 
donor control. . . . 
The federal estate tax should stnke a similar compromise by 
permitting, but limiting, charitable deductions and thereby ensuring that all 
large estates pay some federal estate t~x. ?n th~ one hand_ are the policies of 
encouraging charitable bequests to mamtam a ~1brant chan!able sector and of 
recognizing that resources transferred to chanty do not directly descend to 
the decedent's family. On the other hand, the public fisc has legitimate 
claims for the services it provided during the decedent's lifetime. The estate 
tax is the final accounting for the governmental benefits the decedent 
received while alive. The estates of many contributors to the Giving Pledge 
will largely consist of assets with substantial unrealized appreciation. For 
these estates, estate taxation provides a rough substitute for the income tax 
that the deceased never paid on this unrealized appreciation while alive. 
Bequests to a private foundation may, in dynastic fashion, perpetuate ~ 
substantial economic and political power for the decedent's family which 
controls that foundation. 
Permitting, but limiting, the estate tax charitable deductible would 
balance these competing concerns. Ideally, such a limit would require that all 
large estates pay some federal estate tax, even if they are totally devoted to 
charity. 
The first Part of this Article describes the evolution and current 
limits of the federal income tax charitable deduction. The second Part of this 
Article contrasts the limits of the federal income tax charitable deduction 
with the unbounded nature of the federal estate tax charitable deduction. The 
third Part reviews the arguments for and against the income tax charitable 
deduction and the political dynamic underpinning the compromise embedded 
in the limitations of the current law on the income tax charitable deduction. 
The fourth Part of this Article discusses the debate between proponents and 
~pponents_ of the federal estate tax. The fifth and final Part argues that, in 
hght of this background, the limitations of the federal income tax charitable 
ded_u~tion strike a plausible an~ _stable balance among the contending 
~ohc1es and that the same or a similar compromise should be incorporated 
mto the federal estate tax charitable deduction to ensure that all large estates i 
pay at least some federal estate tax. Pem1itting, but limiting, the estate tax ,i 
" 
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h rl·table deduction would be a sensible compromise of the co t d' c a . . 'bl . . . n en mg 
l·cies as 1t 1s a sens1 e compromise m the context of the income t po l . Pl d . d . ax. 
The Givmg e g: 1s an a 1mrable effort to channel wealth to 
charity. The Giving Pl~dg_e s commendable success, however, highlights the 
tension between the l~m~ted nature of the federal income tax charitable 
deduction and the unlimited federal estate tax charitable deduction. This 
tension is exacerbated by ( 1) the large amounts the Pledgers have committed 
to leave to charity;_ (2) the fact that i:nuch of that wealth will, under current 
law, never be :~bJected to fed~ral mcome or estate taxation; and (3) the 
contending poh_c1es for and a~amst charit~ble deductions. As worthy as the 
Giving Pledge 1s, the Pledge 1s a systematic (albeit inadvertent) threat to the 
federal estate tax. base. The success of the Giving Pledge will, under current 
law, cost the federal Treasury significant revenue because of the estate tax's 
unlimited charitable deduction. 
In light of the contending considerations and the success of the 
Giving Pledge, the compromise embedded in the Code's restrictions on the 
income tax deductibility of charitable donations should be incorporated into 
the federal estate tax to ensure that all large estates pay some federal estate 
tax . 
ll . THE Lt UTS OF THE INCOME TAX CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
The limits of the income tax charitable deduction evolved over half a 
century, from the Revenue Act of 1917 through the Tax Refom, Act of 1969. 
There have been three hallmarks to that evolution. First, over time, the limits 
on the income tax charitable deduction have been liberalized even as the 
perpetuation of those limits has never been seriously challenged. Second, 
these limits are bifurcated with higher charitable deduction caps applying for 
income tax purposes to donations to public charities and to qualifying private 
foundations and lower deduction caps governing donations to all other 
private foundations. Third, these deduction limits, having evolved over 
several generations, have been stable since 1969. Thus, the Code today 
embodies the settled policy that a charitable donor should pay some income 
tax even if he contributes all of his income to charity. 
' Shortly after the modem federal income tax was established in 
1916,9 the Revenue Act of 1917 added to the income tax a limited deduction 
for individuals• contributions "to corporations or associations organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific: or educa;tional 
purposes, or to societies for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, 
9. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271 , 39 Slat. 756· 
I 
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no art of the income of which inures to the benefit of any private 
p . . .d I ,,10 
stockholder or md1v1 ua . . . . 
This original version of the fed~ral mcom~ tax charitable deduction 
tricted to I 5 percent of the donor s taxable mcome calculated With was res 11 • . • • 1 c 1 . out h h ritable deduction. In this m1tia ,ormu at1on, the income t t e c a . bl .b . ax 
h ·t ble deduction treated alike all chanta e contn utions as an individ 1 c an a . . d . ua 
t ayer's contributions to the charities enumerate m the statute We axp , bl . 1, re deductible up to I 5 percent of the taxpayer s _taxa e mcome. ~ This limit 
·nitiated the principle, now deeply embedded m the Code, that a taxpaye 
~ho donates all of his income to charity still pays federal income taxes. r 
The next important innovation in this area was the adoption of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which both increased and, for the first time 
bifurcated the limit on individuals' charitable contribution deductions. Th~ 
1954 Code distinguished contributions to churches, hospitals, and schools 
from donations to all other charities, favoring contributions to the fonner 
over donations to the latter. As part of this change, the Code created the 
concept of an individual taxpayer's "contribution base," 13 the taxpayer's 
adjusted gross income for the year calculated without any net operating 
. d h 14 losses came over to sue year. 
Section 170 of the original 1954 Code provided that an individual 
taxpayer could deduct for income tax purposes contributions to churches, 
hospitals, and schools up to 30 percent of her contribution base. In contrast, 
the deduction for contributions to all other charities was limited to 20 percent 
of the individual taxpayer's contribution base. If a taxpayer's donations to 
these other, less favored charities met or exceeded 20 percent of the 
taxpayer's contribution base, the taxpayer could still deduct up to an 
additional ten percent of his contribution base for donations to schools, 
hospitals, and churches. 
330. 
10. War Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 
11. Id. In this original incarnation, there was no carryover of contributions 
in excess of ~he current year's deduction. Thus, if an individual donated to any 
specified charity an amount equal to 25 percent of his current year's taxable income 
computed without a charitable deduction, the portion of the contribution up to the 15 
percent ceiling was deductible but the rest contributed to charity was permanently 
nondeductible. 
. 12. In _I 936, Congress extended to corporations a similarly limikd 
char~table dedu~t10~. The Revenue Act of 1936 permitted a corporation to deduct 
charitable c~ntnbut1on~ up .to five percent of its taxable income computed without 
such deduction. T_h1s limit 1s t?day embodied in section l 70(b)(2)(A) which limits 
the corporat~ charitable deduction to ten percent of the corporation's taxable income 
calculated without reference to the charitable deduction. I.R.C. § J 70(b)(2)(A). 
13. I.R.C. § I70(b)(l)(G). 
14./d. 
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Thus, almost four decades after th 
d h · h · e Reven . ugurate t e mcome tax c antable ded . ue Act of 19 1na . . uctton th 17 
. creased the hm1ts of that deduction and b ' e 1954 Code bo h 
in . , . b . . em raced th . t 
. d'ividuals contn ut1ons to some donees . . . e pnnciple th in . . -1n1ttally d fi at 
hools and hospitals-are subJect to high d _e tned as church 
scontributions to all other charitable doneeserB educti?n limits than aes. 
c . h 9 . y cont, . re haritable deduction, t e 1 54 Code confinned h . numg to limit th 
~on ors, including. those who contribute their ent~r: ?<>hey that all charitabl: 
pa)' some federal mcome tax. incomes to charity, must 
ln 1956, the higher 30 percent deduct· 1. . 
· d" 'd I ' 'b · \On 1m1t was 
•nciude in iv1 ua s contn ut1ons to cenain h . expanded 10 i . . l ] .. 1 s osp1tal-affir t d 
research organization s . In 1962, Congress appl' d h . ia e "medical 
'b . . . ie I e high 30 limit to contr~ ut1ons to enttlles supporting public colle er. percent 
ln 1964, this favored treatment was extended fu:se 3nd u~iv~rs_ities.16 
contributions to states and localities17 and to charitabl r t~ ~d1v1duals' 
••nonnally receive[l a substantial part of [their] su ~.?ianizat1ons which 
government or "from the general public."'s ppo om state or local 
The 1964 Act, by subjecting charities sup ned ,. 
public" to the higher, 30 percent contribution limit:on foby the general 
Tax Reform Act of 1969.19 The 1969 Act framed the inc~m/:~adowe~ the 
deduction limits as we know them today and introdu d . s chantable 
. .. . . ce into the Code th 
distinction between pnvate foundations" and "public charities.""o e 
I 5. Act of Aug. 7, 1956, ch. 1031, 70 Stat. II 17. 
16. Act of Oct. 23, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-858, § 2, 76 Stat. 1134 I I 
17. Revenue Aet of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 209(a) 78 S ' 19 
34
· 
18. l.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(A)(vi); Revenue Act of 1964, P~b. L.~~- 8:~72 § 
209(a), 78 Stal. 19, 43. The 1964 Act also added r.a""'over prov·15· h.' h 
h · bl d d · · -·, ions w 1c pennitted c anta ~ e ucttons m excess of the current year's limit to be camed 
over and deducted m subsequent years. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272 § 
209(c)(l), 78 Stal. 19, 45. ' 
l 9. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487. 
20. The distinction between private foundations and public charities \\as 
also presaged by section 331 of the Revenue Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. & I~ 14, 64 
Stat. 957, which added section 3813 and section 3814 to the 1939 Code. Section 
3 g 13 of the 1939 Code became section 503 of the 1954 Code. Before the T a.x 
Refom1 Act of 1969 became effective in 1970, section 503 proscribed ''prohibited 
transactions" with certain section 501(c)(3) charities. The charities subject 10 the 
prohibited transaction rules of section 503 were defined residually as all exempt 
organizations other than the groups today labeled as pubhc charities under seclion 
509(a)( L ). Thus, section 503 largely applied to the institulions classified as private 
foundations by the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Section 503 remains in the Code in 
highly attenuated form. lt_ has l~gely ~en superseded by se~tion 4941 (penalizing 
"self-dealing" between private foundations and persons pos1uoned to control them) 
and section 4975 (penaliz.ing "prohibited transactions" bet\\een tax-exempt 
retirement trusts and persons positioned to control them). 
./ ()() /Vu/, 16. 7 
As a result of the 1969 Act, the Code classifies all . 
'1 . . . h .. bl" h . . ,, section 50l(c)(3t ,~rgamzat1o~s ash e1
1
t er pu 1c 
I 
c_ ant~es"·- or ''private 
foundatjons··- and subJ~cts t_ e att~r to reg~ ation_ inapplicable to the 
fonner:~ In contrast to private toundat1ons, public charities are regulated 1 
heavily because public ch_arities "ei_ther ~ave broad public support or activ;~~ 
functi?n . in -~
5 
supporting relat1onsh1p to such [publicly supported~ 
oruamzat1ons. 
~ As a result of t~e 1969 ~ct. ~our ca~~go~!es of section 50l(c)(J) 
organizations are denominated as ·public charities. The Code then defines 
priYate foundations residually, as any section 50l(c)(3) tax-exempt charitv 
which does not fit into one of these four public charity categories. 26 • 
First, under section 509(a)(l), a section 50l(c)(3) entity is a public 
charity, rather than a private foundation, if it is one of the entities favored 
before 1969 with the higher 30 percent deduction limit, that is, a church, a 
school, a hospital, a hospital-affiliated medical research organization, an 
organization supporting a public college or university, a state or locality, or a 
charitable organization nonnally receiving substantial support from state or 
local government or from the general public.27 
Second, under section 509(a)(2), a section 501(c)(3) entity (even 
though not one of these listed entities) is a public charity, rather than a 
private foundation, if it meets two arithmetic tests to demonstrate that it is 
nonnally publicly supported.2s An example of a public charity under section 
Section 331 of the Revenue Act of I 950 also added to the 1939 Code 
section 38 I 4 denying tax exemption to organizations if their income was 
accumulated unreasonably, used for nonexempt purposes, or invested in a manner 
which jeopardized the organization's exemption function. These ideas are today 
implemented in more elaborate form by the network of regulatory taxes pertaining to 
private foundations. See l.R.C. §§ 4942 (penalty ta-..: on private foundation's "failure 
to distribute income .. ); 4945 (penalty tax on private foundation's "taxable 
expenditure"); 4944 (penalty tax on private foundation which "invests any amount in 
such a manner as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes"). 
21. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
22. Rev. Rul. 2003- 13, 2003-1 C.B. 305. 
23. I.R.C. § 509. 
24. I.R.C. §§ 4940-46. 
25. Reg. § l.509(a)- I. 
26. l.R.C. § 509. 
27. LR.C. § 509(a)( I). 
28. The first of these arithmelic tests for section 509(a)(2) public charity 
status is that a section 50l(c)(J) entity must "nonnally'' receive more than ··one third 
of its support'' from any combination of "gifts. grants, contributions. [ ) membership 
fees" and "gross receipts from admissions, sales of merchandise, perfommnce or 
services, or furnishing of facilities." I.R.C. § 509(a)(1)(A). Second, the entity must 
not "nonnally" receive more than "one-third of its support" from passive 
2014] The Buffett-Gates Giving Pledge 401 
509(a)(2) is a ?onpro~t museum which qu~lifies as tax-exempt under section 
SOl(c)(3), wluch receives no ~ndowment mcome and which supports itself 
solely from annual membership dues, patro_ns' admissions fees when they 
nter the museum, and revenues from a gift shop which sells art-related 
:oaks, reprints, and souvenirs. This museum is supported solely from 
membership dues, receipts from admissions, and sales of art-related 
merchandise, and therefore qualifies as a public charity under section 
509(a)(2). 
In contrast, assume that a nonprofit museum endowed by a wealthy 
donor receives more than one-third of its support from the passive 
investment income generated by this endowment.29 This museum is a private 
foundation since it is neither one of the traditionally favored forms of charity 
specified in section 509(a)(l) nor does it meet the mathematical tests for 
public support under section 509(a)(2). Consequently, as a private foundation 
rather than a public charity, this museum must comply with the tighter 
regulation that private foundation classification entails. 30 
The third fonn of public charity under section 509(a)(3) is an 
organization which supports either a section 509(a)(l) public charity (one of 
the previously favored section 50l(c)(3) groups such as a school, church, or 
hospital) or which supports a section 509(a)(2) public charity (such as our 
hypothetical museum which receives all its income from membership fees, 
admissions receipts, and art-related sales).31 In effect, a section 509(a)(3) 
support organization piggybacks off the public charity status of the tax-
exempt entity the section 509(a)(3) organization supports. 
Finally, section 501(c)(3) entities "organized and operated 
exclusively for testing for public safety" are public charities.32 
"investment income" and "unrelated business taxable income." l.R.C. § 
509(a)(2)(B). 
29. A well-known example would be the J. Paul Getty Museum, ~pe~ted 
by the J. Paul Getty Trust, a private foundation. See Form 990-PF (Return of Pnvate 
Foundation) for fiscal year ending 6/30/10 of the J. Paul Getty Trust 
http://www.getty.edu/about/governance/pdf s/990pf-201 0.pdf. 
30. 1.R.C. §§ 4940-46. 
31 . 1.R.C. § 509(a)(3). . 
32. l.R.C. § 509(a)(4). Organizations undertaking public safety tesll~g ~ave 
a unique status sin~e they are tax-exempt under section 50l(c)_(3) but contnbutton~ 
to such organizations arc not income tax deductible under sectt0n _I ?O(c)_- Comp,lr~ 
l.R.C. § SOl(c)(3) (''testing for public safety" is a tax-exempt functt~n) wuh l.~.C.} 
l 70(c)(2)(8) (not listing such testing as a charitable acti~ity). I~ its mt~rp_retall~~i~h 
the term "testing for public safety" the IRS has d1stmguished tcStmg ~ f 
.. • . • . ,. ·t rs" from safety testml! o pnnc1pally serves the private interest ol the manu,a1.: ure 78 -, c- 8 
.. . bl. " R Rul 78-P6 19 -- · · consumer products used by the ~encral pu 1c. ev. · - ' 
17S. 
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Any section 501(c)(3) organization which fails all four t 
b . h . . b d f: I I . s atutory t for pu he c anty status 1s, y e au t, c ass1fied as a private " . es(s 
I .fi . h . " d . ioundat10 ,J Such c ass1 1cat1on causes t e private 1oun at1on to be subject to th n. 
of regulatory excise taxes added to the Code by the 1969 Act. 34 e network 
Instructive in this context is the legislative history of they R 
Th. I · I · h" ax eforn, Act of 1969. 1s eg1s at1ve 1story enumerates the concern which . 
the distinction between public charities and private foundations ani;ated 




foundations to abuse by the persons controlling them: "it is cle private 
· d · d · · · • ar thar vigorous an extensive a mm1strat10n 1s needed in order to p . 
. h . ti d . .II rov1de 
approp:rafute adss~ranches. t bait private o~~ at1ons w1 promptly and properly 
use their n s 1or c arita e purposes. 
Among the abuses requiring tighter regulation of private foundati 
f · ti d · · I b ons were the "use o a private oun at1on to improper y enefit those who cont 1 h ti d . "36 II h " bl " 1 · ro t e oun at1on as we as t e unreasona e accumu anon of wealth 
inside private foundations. 37 A particular concern was "[t]he use of 
foundations to maintain control of businesses, particularly small familv 
corporations."38 "Those who wish to use a foundation's stock holdings 1; 
retain business control in some cases are relatively unconcerned about 
producing income to be used by the foundation for charitable purposes."39 
To combat the abuse of private foundations and their resources, the 
Tax Refonn Act of 1969 added to the Code the network of regulatory taxes 
applying to such foundations. 40 Among these are a penalty tax levied on f 
private foundations which fail to distribute for charitable purposes an annual 
amount equal to at least five percent of the fair market value of their assets41 
and a penalty tax on "self-dealing" transactions between private foundations 
and the insiders who control them. 42 
The 1969 Act, even as it liberalized the limits of the income tax 
charitable deduction, reinforced the bifurcated nature of those limits: the 
deduction for individuals' donations to nonqualifying private foundations is 
capped at a lower percentage of the donor's contribution base (30 percent) 
33. LR.C. § 509(a). 
34. I.R.C. §§ 4940-46. 
35. H.R. Rep. No. 91-413, pt. I, at 19 (1969). 
36. Id. at 20. 
37. Id. at 25. 
38. Id. at 27. 
39. Id. Among other abuses motivating the reforms of the 1969 Act wen: 
private foundations' "use [of] their money for 'educational' grants to enable people 
to take vacations abroad, to have paid interludes between jobs, and to subsidize the 
preparation of materials furthering spcci fie political viewpoints." Id. at 33. /JI' 
40. I.R.C. §§ 4940-46. / 
41. LR.C. § 4942. 
42. 1.R.C. § 4941. 
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than is ~he d~duction for donations to public charities and to certain private 
foundations. 
A higher 50 percent deduction limit applies to gifts to ubl' 
44 . d · · . p IC 
charities as well a~ to onati~ns to private :otm_dattons deemed less prone to 
dynastic accumulations. Spe~1fically, contributions to a private foundation 
qualify for the 50 percent mcome tax deduction limit if the foundation 
satisfies one of three statutory tests. The first of these tests is that the 
foundation be a "private operating foundation" engaged in the "active 
conduct'' of charitabl~ functions.4~ For_ex?mple, an endowed museum might 
be a private operatmg foundatton 1f It meets the necessary statutory 
requirements indi~ating th?t i_t conducts active operations.~6 The second type 
of private foundation quahfymg for the SO percent deduction limit is a pass-
thru foundation which distributes, rather than accumulates, all contributions 
made to it.47 Third, donations to a private foundation are subject to the 50 
percent income tax deduction limit if the donee foundation would have 
qualified as a section S09(a)(3) support organization but for the ability of 
substantial contributors to designate the particular recipients of the 
d · , 48 foun atton s support. 
Individuals' income tax deductions for contributions to all other 
private foundations are limited to 30 percent of the donor's contribution 
base.49 If, for example, an endowed museum, which is a private foundation, 
43. Compare l.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(A) with I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(B). This 
bifurcation is bolstered by special limits added 10 the Code for individuals' in-kind 
charitable contributions of "capital gain property" such as appreciated stocks and 
bonds. If, instead of contributing cash, an individual taxpayer donates capital gain 
property to a public charity or to a qualifying private foundation, the applicable 
deduction limit is 30 percent of the donor's contribution base. However, if an 
individual taxpayer instead transfers capital gain property to a nonqualifying private 
foundation, that is, a private foundation which is not an operating, pass-thru, or 
supporting foundation, the deduction is limited to 20 percent of the donor's 
contribution base. 1.R.C. §§ l 70(b)( I )(C)(i), I 70(b)( I )(C)(iv), I 70(b)( l)(D)(i). 
44. While public testing organizations are tax-exempt under section 
S01(c)(3), donations to such testing organizations do not qualify as charitable under 
section l 70(c). See supra note 32. 
45. l.R.C. §§ l70(b)(l)(A)(vii), 170(b)(l)(F)(i). 
46. Reg.§ 53.4942(b}-l(d), Ex. l. 
47. I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(l)(A)(vii), \70(b)(l)(F)(ii). 
48. l.R.C. §§ l 70(b)(l)(A)(vii), l 70(b)(l)(F)(iii). . ., 
49. LR.C. § 170(b)( I )(B). The Tax Reform Act of 1969 _left intact thefi ~? 
percent deduction cap for donor's contributions to private foundatw~s. _The De icit 
Reduction Act of 1984 subsequently increased the deduction hnut ~or cash 
'b · · d · 30 t of the donor's contnbut10n base contn ut1ons to private foun allons to percen . . 
while retaining the 20 percent deduction limit for in-kind contributions of prope~1· 
See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 30l(a), (c), 98 stat. 4 • 
777- 79. 
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fails to qualify as an operating foundation, as a pass-thru foundation, or as a 
support foundation, an individual donor to that museum may, for income tax 
purposes, deduct contributions to suc~
0
museum only up to 30 percent of the 
donor's contribution base for the year. 
Three themes emerge from the evolution of the limitations of the 
federal income tax charitable deduction: liberalization, bifurcation, and 
stability. Since the Tax Refon11 Act of 1969, individual donors have been 
able to deduct up to 50 percent of their respective contribution bases for 
donations to public charities and to qualifying private foundations. This 50 
percent deduction limit is over three times the original 15 percent deduction 
limit established by the Revenue Act of 1917. Even the lower limit which 
today caps deductions for gifts to nonqualifying private foundations-3o 
percent of the donor's contribution base-was the pre-1969 limit for 
contributions to favored charities as they were then defined. Thus, the 
direction of the tax law has been the liberalization of the limits on the income 
tax charitable deduction. 
However, the existence of charitable deduction limits has never been 
seriously contested. Thus, the liberalization of the restrictions on the income 
tax charitable deduction has been constrained by the assumptions that such 
restrictions will continue to exist and that all charitable donors will pay some 
income tax, even if they donate all of their incomes to charity.51 
50. Any contribution above that limitation would carryover for possible 
deductibility in subsequent years. The deduction carryover for contributions to 
private foundations was added to the Code by section 30 I (b) of The Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, 778. 
51. Instructive in this context is an "unlimited" charitable deduction, 
available under rarefied circumstances between 1939 and I 969. Section 120 of the 
Internal Revenue Code of I 939, I.R.C. § 120 ( I 939), permitted an individual 
taxpayer to deduct for income tax purposes all of her charitable contributions in the 
current year if, in that current year "and in each of the ten preceding taxable years," 
federal income, "war-profits" and "excess-profits" taxes plus charitable contributions 
absorbed more than 90 percent of the taxpayer's taxable income determined without 
a charitable deduction. Slightly modified, this unlimited charitable deduction was 
continued in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 but was phased out by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969. In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, this unlimited charitable 
deduction was repealed altogether. See l.R.C. § 170(b )( 1 )( C) (1954 ); Tax Reform 
Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §201(a), 83 Stat. 487, 549 (phasing out the 
unlimited charitable deduction); Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 
Stat. 1520 ( eliminating the unlimited charitable deduction). 
At one level, this unlimited charitable deduction was something of a 
~ur!o~ity as it was available only under very esoteric circumstances, namely, an 
md1v1dual taxpayer who, for a decade, spent more than 90 percent of her taxable 
!ncome on ~ederal income taxes and charity. On the other hand, the policy 
implemented m the Tax Reform Acts of 1969 and 1976 is instructive: as the limits of 
the income tax charitable deduction were liberalized for most individual taxpayers, 
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Moreover, the deduction limits, as they have e 1 
. vo ved arc bifu ,i 
. ·teging for income tax purposes individuals' tra fi ' rcate.., 
pnvt orted organizations and to _qualifying private foundat~~n:r(s. to publi~ly-
supp thni and support foundations.) Donations to the fi ,.e., operating. 
pass- d d . 1. . onner are subiect t the higher, 50 perce~t e uctton 1m1t while transfers to all other J ·v o 
r: ndations are subJect to the lower 30 percent deduct· 
1
. . pn ate 
1ou - . " d . . 10n 1m11 These qualifying private 1oun ahons, while charitable • · 
non 1 b in nature are less 
" vored under the tax aw ecause they are deemed les bl' ' ia bl. h . . s pu tc and more One to abuse than are pu 1c c ant1es and qualifying pn·vat • d . pr . • fr e 1oun attons A thud theme emergmg om the evolution of these rul • b' : 
· · · f h · es 1s sta 1l1ty While the lnmtabttons o tkedm~ome· 
9
tax ~~aritable deduction for individuai 
taxpayers have cen twea 'e smce I 69, the basic structure h . 
h . . h h . as remained intact since t en, restnctmg t e c antable deduction to a percent f h 
.b . b .f h age o t e donor's contn ut1on ase even 1 s e donates all of her income to charity. 
11 l. THE ESTATE TAX CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
In cont~ast to the fe~eral income tax charitable deduction, the federal 
estate tax charitable deduction has been unlimited since its inception and 
remains so today. The Revenue Act of 191653 established the modem federal 
estate tax. The Revenue Act of 19185~ added a deduction to the estate tax for 
[t]hc amount of all bequests, legacies, devise, or gifts, to or 
for the use of the United States, any State, Territory, any 
political subdivision thereof, or the District of Columbia, for 
exclusively public purposes, or to or for the use of any 
corporation organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, 
including the encouragement of art and the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of 
which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or 
individual, or to a trustee or trustees exclusively for such 
religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational 
ss purposes. 
the importance of those limits was atlirmed by the abolition ?f the unlimited 
deduction available to the few taxpayers meeting the stringent tests introduced by the 
1939 Code. 
52. See supra notes 43 and 51. . 
5 3. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, §§ 200-l 2, 39 stat. 7' 6• 777 · 
54. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057. 
55. Id. at§ 403(a)(3), 1098. 
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Over the years, Congress has expanded the definition of cha -1. I n res for estate tax purposes just as Congress has en arged the scope of the defi . . 
. rn111on 
of charitable donees for mcome tax purposes. Thus, today eni· . 
56 JI s1 rties 
encouraging amateur sports as we as veterans groups qualify as do 
. . . . ~~ 
for both the income tax and estate tax charitable deductions. Neverthele 
today's unlimited federal estate tax deduction is recognizably the unlimit:d 
deduction first promulgated in 19 I 8. 
IV. WHY HA VE CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS? 
Among the seminal figures in the debate about the charitable 
deduction was Professor Stanley Surrey who first formulated the theory of 
tax expenditures, that is, some deductions, credits and other provisions of the 
tax law are designed, not to measure a taxpayer's ability to pay, but to 
subsidize, penalize, or reward certain fonns of behavior. Tax expenditures. 
Professor Surrey influentially argued, should be compared with direct 
spending programs designed to subsidize, penalize, or reward the same 
behavior.58 For Professor Surrey and his followers, the income tax charitable 
deduction is classic tax expenditure, a feature of the Code which does not 
measure the taxpayer's capacity to pay tax. Rather, the income tax's 
charitable deduction is "a method of providing federal financial assistance to 
private philanthropy.''59 
Federal tax expenditure budgets reflect this characterization, 
classifying the federal income tax charitable contribution deduction as a 
major tax expenditure.60 As a tax expenditure, the deduction is projected to 
entail a revenue loss for fiscal 2014 in excess of$40 billion.61 
56. l.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2)(B), 2055(a)(2). 
57. I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(3), 2055(a)(4). 
58. Professor Surrey's seminal articulation of the tax expenditure theory 
was Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 
(1970) [hereinafter Surrey, Tax Incentives]. Among his other important \.vritings on 
tax expenditures were STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973) 
[hereinafter SURREY, PATHWAYS] and STANLEY s. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, 
TAX EXPENDITURES (1985) [hereinafter SURREY & MCDANIEL, TAX 
EXPENDITURES]. 
59. SURREY, PATHWAYS, supra note 58, at 224. 
60. See, e.g .. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 113TH CONG., ESTIMATES 
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2017 39 (Comm. Print 
~? 13) ("?edu.ction f~r charitabl~ co~tributions to educational institutions"); id at 40 
( d~?uctwn_ for ~hanta~le contnbut10ns, other than for education and health''); id at 
41 ( deduction for charitable contributions to health organizations''). 
61. ld 
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The charitable deduction is subject t 
· d oc d \62 • · • 0 all of Prof ubstant1ve an pr e ura cntic1sms of ta . essor SUJTey' 
s . . l x expendttur . . s 
strongest cnt1que, name y, tax expenditures, .. . es mcludmg his 
1 " "ft f $100 h d upside-down,,63 charitab e g1 o cas an a consequent d d . nature: a 
$70 to the person in the 70 percent bracket-h e uction °fSIOO is worth 
• e saves a S70 
allocates $70 of public funds-and only $l4 to a t~ and thus bracket."64 person m the first 
ln conttas~, others reject the tax expenditure label . 
charitable deductton and conclude that the ded t· . as applied to the 
• ~~m~ap · 
Provision for measunng the taxpayer's ability to a F th propnate 
• P Y · or ese observ charitable donations represent sacrifice of personal ers. 
· d h resources rather than consumption an are t us properly deducted in detenn·m· h 
mg t e taxpayer's income tax base. 
In this vein, another seminal figure in the debate about th h · bl 
. ~ W"\\" e C anta e deduction, Pro1essor 1 1am D. Andrews, started with the famo H · • 
d ti . . f . us a1g Simons e 1mtton o income as the sum of the taxpayers' savings and 
consumption. From this premise, Professor Andrews argued that 
consumption for income tax purposes should mean "private consumption" 
or, even more restrictively, "private, preclusive household consumption:"°5 
From this vantage, resources transferred by a taxpayer to charity should be 
deducted to properly measure the taxpayer's net income since those 
transferred resources benefit the community at large or some significant 
segment of that community rather than the taxpayer herself.66 The income ta, 
charitable deduction thus defines the base of the income tax to measure the 
net income on which the taxpayer should pay tax. 
Professor William J. Turnier summarized this argument for the 
income tax charitable deduction as a means of measuring the taxpayer's 
capacity to pay: 
62. As a procedural matter, Professor Surrey's chief cl~ims ,~ere that, in the 
legislative process, tax expenditures are I~~ visi~l~ th: ~~:t~t:~:n:u~::r~~:; 
tax expenditures are formulated and adrnmtstered_t yes address For discussion and 
. . • · h r1· · the areas the expen I ur · 
mstttuttons wit expe 1se m ard A z r ky Do Ta.t Expendi111res Create 
criticism of these arguments, see Edw · e 10~ 'E:cemptions and the Parado.t 
Framing Effects? Vol11nteer_Firefighters-::1:~'>'79~t (2005); Ed,~ard A.. Zelinsky, 
of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA. T . 0 · 1 1. A Procedural Defense of Tax d P bl· Cl · e at G11cc1 u c 1· James Madison an II ic wic L J 1165 (1993). 
Expenditures and Tax lnstit11tions. 102 YALE .. 8 122· SURREY & MCDANIEL, 
63. Surrey, Tax Incentives, s11pra note 5 'at ' 
TAX EXPENDITURES, supra note 58, at 79· 58 at 225 
64. SURREY, PATHWAYS, s11pr~ not~ Dttd11ctio11~ in an Ideal Income_ Tat, 86 
65. William D. Andrews, Pet son_a ft Andrews, Personal Ded11c11ons]. 
HARV. L. REV. 309,313,371 (19?2) [herema er 
66. lei. at 344. 
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Because our income tax is an individual, rather than 
societal, tax, only the benefit that each individual derive: 
from public programs should be designated as consumption 
. . . . It is therefore necessary to adopt a definition of 
consumption grounded on the view that an out flow of funds 
resulting in a diminution of an individual's net worth shall 
not be deemed consumption if the outflow provides a 
substantial benefit to the general public and an insignificant 
private benefit to the party making the expenditure. 67 
This vantage buttr~sses the bifur~ated ~ature of the individual 
income tax limits on c~ant_able contributions smce ~on~tions to public 
charities are more pubhc m nature than are contributions to private 
foundations, which often entail significant private, consumption-like benefit 
for the donor and his family. 
Professor Boris Bittker was also a tax expenditure critic and viewed 
the charitable deduction as an appropriate, base-defining feature of an 
income tax, given the judgments inherent in designing tax and budget 
policies: 68 "[t]he assertion that a deduction for charitable contributions is 
inconsistent or incompatible with a proper measure of taxable income is 
d 'd f . ,,69 evo1 o ment. 
Professor Bittker favored an unlimited charitable deduction 
contending that the income tax limits of section 170 only make sense "as; 
compromise between those who believe in a [charitable] deduction and those 
who would repeal it."70 Since Professor Bittker strongly believed in the 
deduction, he went so far as to label such compromise "preposterous."71 As J 
will discuss below, the compromise which Professor Bittker viewed 
negatively is now a long-standing feature of the federal income tax. It makes 
sense to extend that compromise, in the form of deduction limits, to the 
estate tax charitable deduction to ensure that all large estates pay some estate 
tax-or to at least get closer to that ideal. 
As the debate over the income tax charitable deduction has 
progressed, commentators have both elaborated these initial themes and 
introduced new ones. Professor Mark P. Gergen, for example, is highly 
critical of Professor Andrews' defense of the income tax charitable 
67. William J. Turnier, Evaluating Persona{ Deductions in 011 lncomt! Ta.,· 
- The Ideal, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 262,274 ( 1981 ). 
68. Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contribwions: Tax Deductions or Matching 
Grants?, 28 TAX L. REV. 37 (1972) [hereinafter Bittker, Matching GrantsJ. 
69. Id. at 56. 








as a base-defining measure and • 
. . is equally .. 
deduction 1s granted for donations to "sports m . cntical that the 
,,13 H useums Jazz fi . 
singing groups. . ow ever, Professor Gergen vie~s e_st1vals, and 
Charitable deduction more favorably in other co t the income tax n exts as an •d freeriding problems and the consequent underfu d. anti ote to 
goods 
74 Moreover, the "upside-down" effect bne mfig ?f desirable public 
· . . ne Ittmg high b donors 1s offset when the chanty that such high bra k t d er racket 1s . c e onors fund 
the disadvantaged. This leads Professor Gergen to f th . serves 
d d . f d . avor e mcome tax charitable e uct1on or onations to "social welfare ch • . 
l . Arm ,,16 ant1es, such as the Sa vation y. 
Professor John D. Colombo similarly views the chan·t bl d d • 
. . a e e uct1on, 
along with tax exemption, as a means of channe1·1 • 
· · · h ng assistance to 
orgaruzanons wh1c suffer from underfunding because of free ·d· n 
..-r1s. n mg. 
. Professor Ray_ D. Madon _is perturbed that the subsidy embedded in 
the mcome tax chantab\e deduction "is only available to the charitable 
donations of the very wealthy ... those who itemize their deductions ,,79 
Moreover, she finds this subsidy for the charitable donations of the affiue~t 
particularly troubling due to the fact that wealthy Americans 
tend to make very different types of bequests than their 
countrymen. While most Americans direct their charitable 
dollars to religious organizations, approximately three 
quarters of all bequests reported on estate tax returns go 
either to private foundations or educational institutions.80 
Private foundations, Professor Madoff argues, expend inordinate 
amounts of their tax-subsidized resources compensating the trustees and 
professional investment managers who manage such foundations and such 
foundations' endowments.81 
72. Mark p. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 
74VA. L.REv. l393, 1414-26(1988). 
73. Id. at 1450. 
74. Id. at 1398, 1448. 
75. Id. at 1405. 
76. Id. at 1447. Cl · bl 
77 John D Colombo The Marketing of Philanthropy and t!1e ,ar11a.,. e 
· · ' . .,.1 · fi the Deductwn and I at Contributions Deduction: Integratmg 1 , 1eones or 
Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 657 (200Hl).I / Can Teach Us Abo111 the 
78 Ray D Madoff Whal Leona e ms ey 
. . . . , K L REV 957 (2010). Charitable Deduction, 85 CHI.- ENT • · 
79. Id. at 965. 
80. Id. at 966. 
81. Id. at 973. 
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. In a ~imilar vein, Professor Ilan Benshalom82 criticizes the charitable 
deduction as 1t 
Florida Tax Review 
"promotes a nondemocratic decision-making process for 
allocating public money. Rather than deciding the allocation 
of public funds through majoritarian decision-making 
processes, charitable relief allows individuals to decide how 
to allocate a share of public resources at the expense of the 
majority. "83 
In contrast to the cnttque of the charitable deduction as 
antidemocratic, Dean Saul Levmore views the charitable deduction as a form 
of "direct democracy."84 Each donor's contribution to a particular charity is 
his "ballot" by which he channels publicly-funded tax subsidy to the charity 
of his choice. In light of the imperfections of conventional electoral and 
legislative decisionmaking, "the charitable deduction may be a relatively 
clever tool"85 for "gathering information about majoritarian or other 
preferences. "86 
Moreover, Dean Levmore suggests that the charitable deduction may 
have other benefits in maintaining a vibrant charitable sector. For example, 
the charitable deduction 
induce[s] citizens not only to choose for themselves where to 
apply personal and government funds, but also to develop a 
sense of commitment to the chosen charities. Thus, they 
become involved individually as volunteers in ways that 
they would not if their tax money were simply allocated to 
the charities by the legislature or by government 
bureaucrats. 87 
82. Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 
IND. L.J. I 047 (2009). 
83. Id. at I 050. 
84. Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387,426 (1998). 
85. Id. at 409. See also id. at 413 ("one advantage of balloting through 
charitable donations (as precursors to later deductions) is a reduction in the 
collective choice problem associated with appropriating funds through either a 
conventional popular ballot or a checkoff device. This form of balloting through the 
tax system is likely to be a superior collective choice procedure."). 
86. Id. at 409. 
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Professor Eric Zolt has recently summarized this d b 88 
· · . ll d d b A d B. e ate. The 
guments m1tta y a vance Y n rews, 1ttker and Turni'er " d ar . . . ' were onor-
cocused, pos1tmg that mcome transferred for charitable purpose 
,, . d . s was not 
Personal consumption an , as 1t was no longer in the control of th d 1 d d f t ,,g9 S b e onor, should be exc u e rom ax. u sequent advocates of the inco ta 
charitable deduction went _beyond the defense of the deduction as :~ase~ 
defining-measure, calculatmg the ta~payer's capacity to pay. Rather, these 
advocates asserted that t~e deduction "~elps correct market or political 
failures" and thereby mcreases public goods "that are otherwise 
underprovided because of free-rider and other challenges."90 Yet other 
proponents laud the charitable deduction because it "helps decentralize the 
d. ,,,91 spen mg process. 
[s]upporters note both the diversity and the higher quality of 
charitable goods and services that come from programs 
funded by individuals who devote money, and often time 
and expertise, in selecting, managing, and monitoring 
activities that often benefit society at large, rather than those 
programs selected by some Washington bureaucrat and 
managed and monitored by government employees.92 
On the other hand, Professor Zolt notes that the income tax 
charitable deduction has its costs, including "foregone revenue"93 and, as 
Professor Surrey first observed, the deduction's "upside-down" effect. To 
Professor Surrey and those who have followed his lead, charitable donations 
represent consumption which properly remains part of the income tax base 
rather than sacrifice of personal resources properly giving rise to a deduction. 
In political terms, the compromises embedded in the limits on the income tax 
charitable deduction reflect a stable stalemate between, on the one hand, the 
charities benefitting from the deduction and, on the other, the federal 
Treasury as the gatekeeper protecting public revenues. The chari!able sector 
is a well-organized and well-financed lobbying force in Washmgton.
94 
In 
88. Eric Zoll, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions: DomeStic 
Activities, Foreign Activities, or None of the Above, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 361 <2012). 
89. Id. at 364. 
90. id. 
91. Jd. 
92. id. at 365. 
93. id. S R last accessed Sept. 25, 
94. See, e.g., Policy & Advocacy, l~DEP. ECTO ' "We serve as a voice 
2014, https://www.independentsector.org/pohcy_a~vo:acy ( 1 t ry and economic 
~nd source of information on the most pressing legtSlative, regu a :~ COUNCIL ON 
tsSues facing the nonprofit sector."); MOLLY CORBETT BROAD, · 
.//] Florida Tax Review 
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tension with it, the Treasury keeps score of tax expenditures,95 an intl . 
. Id f b d . Th h · · uential task m a wor o u getary constraint. e c anties receiving ded .6 donations would undoubtedly prefer further liberalization of the deducti_ le 
. . . uct1on hmtts. The ta~ expend1tur_e bu_dge_t annually tells Congress the cost of the 
current deduction and, by 1mphcat1on, the revenues to be gained by Jim•.-
the deduction further, as well as the expense to the Treasury of fu~~ng 
liberalizing the deduction's limits. For two generations, these contend· er 
forces have, in political terms, offset each other, leaving intact the inco~g 
tax charitable deduction limits Congress fashioned in 1969. e 
V. SHOULD THERE BE A FEDERAL ESTATE TAX? 
Just as the federal income tax charitable deduction has triggered 
exhaustive debate, the federal estate tax has been the subject of extensive 
discussion. Among the arguments advanced by estate tax proponents are that 
the tax raises revenues for the federal fisc, that the estate tax contributes to 
the overall progressivity of federal taxation, that the estate tax backstops the 
federal income tax, and that the estate tax disperses inherited concentrations 
of wealth. Some opponents of the estate tax support these goals but argue 
that the estate tax does not effectively implement them. Other opponents of 
the estate tax challenge these goals while denouncing the estate tax as 
immoral and inefficient. Because this debate has focused on whether there 
should be an estate tax, little attention has been given to the implications of 
the estate tax's unlimited charitable deduction. 
Prominent among estate tax proponents is Bill Gates, Sr. Attorney 
Gates is a leader of Responsible Wealth, a pro-estate-tax lobbying effort 
supported by affluent individuals including Warren Buffett, George Soros, 
Robert Rubin, John Bogle, Dr. Abigail Disney, Dr. Richard Rockefeller, 
Robert Crandall, and Norman Lear.96 Attorney Gates' support of the estate 
tax derives from the premise "that society has a just claim on the 
accumulated wealth of its most prosperous citizens.''97 This claim stems from 
''the undervalued role of society's investment in each of us. This investment 
is substantial and often invisible. "98 
Starting from this premise, Attorney Gates identifies several virtues 
of the federal estate tax. Chief among these is that the estate tax is "a 
EDUC., COMMENTS TO THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COl\1MITTEE TAX REFORI\I 
WORKING GROUP ON CHARITABLE/EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2013 ). 
95. See supra note 60. 
96. Signers of Responsible Wealth Statement in Support of Estate Tax, 
supra note 3. 
97. WILLIAM H. GATES SR. & CHECK COLLINS, WEAL TH AND 0l1R 
COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICA SllOULD TAX ACCUMULATED fORlUNES I 10 
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d endable and highly progressive source of revenue"99 and th h ep • d 1- • 1 . at t e tax fu thers economic an po itica equality and opportunity by d' . . h' r . 100 " imm1s mg 
inherited concentrations of wealth: [t]he estate tax both limits the power 
f concentrated wealth and generates revenue to pay for govemm fr o ,,101 ent om 
those most able to pay. 
Attorney Gates also argues that the estate tax is "a cons'd bl 
. · bl · · ,,102 A 1 . . 1 era e incentive to chanta e giving. s will discuss, there is tension between 
on the one hand, the arguments that the estate tax raises revenue and 
deconcenttates wealth and, on the other, the unlimited nature of the estate tax 
charitable deduction. The deduction both costs the federal fisc revenue and 
at least as to gifts to private foundations, may perpetuate dynastic fortunes. ' 
Attorney Gates makes clear his agreement with estate tax opponents 
that, before President George W. Bush's estate tax reforms, the tax applied 
too broadly. In 200 I, the tax was levied on taxable estates over $675,000.1°3 
In contrast, Attorney Gates states that an exemption of $3,500,000 per 
decedent is "fair" and "targets the tax on those most able to pay."10-I He also 
identifies a household net worth of $15,000,000 as the threshold at which 
further accumulations go "beyond the point of meeting [the household's] 
needs and aspirations of itself and its heirs."105 It thus appears that the current 
federal estate tax, which exempts for each decedent $5,000,000 of wealth 
adjusted for inflation, 106 falls within or close to the parameters of a Gates-
acceptable estate tax. 
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker allies himself 
with Attorney Gates' arguments for a federal estate tax "on truly huge 
fortunes:"107 
[T]he concept of equality of opportunity and dispersion of 
wealth and economic power has been a part of the American 
psyche. The inheritance of huge fortunes, far beyond any 
99. Id. at 9. 
l 00. Id. at 13-25. 
101. ld. at 8. 
102. Id. at 132. 
l 03. See l.R.C. section 201 O(c) as in effect for 2001 as result of amendment 
by section 50\(a)(l)(B) of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 
111 Stat. 788, 845 ("applicable exclusion amount" for 2001 was $675,000). 
104. GATES SR. & COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH, supra 
note 97, at 138. 
l 05. Id. at 17. . ,, SS 000 000 
106. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3) (defining "basic exclusion amount as , • 
adjusted for inflation). s & CHECK 
107 Paul A Volcker Foreword to WILLIAM H. GATES R. T 
• . ' . WHY AMERICA SHOULD AX COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH. 
ACCUMULATED FORTUNES, al xiii (2002). 
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reasonable need for education, for medical care and ti 
. , or a 
comfortable-even luxunous-standard of living has 
rested easily with that political philosophy. 10s never 
Professor Joel Dobris is skeptical of the estate tax as a reve . 
or as a means of effectively deconcentrating wealth. 109 He instead ;ue raiser 
d · bl · · ' 1 · · I h avors the tax as a es1ra e exercise rn 'po 1t1ca t eater and culture:"110 
[T]he crucial purpose of the tax is to assert the hegemony of 
the common people and the egalitarian nature of our society; 
to undermine oligarchy. To put it crudely, 1 think the 
purpose of the tax is to take a little bite out of rich people's 
butts, to remind them of the essential nature of this 
country. 111 
For Professor Dobris, ''it is vital to draw a very bright line between 
the prosperous upper middle class and the really rich." 112 He favors an estate 
tax exemption of $ I 0,000,000 per decedent but "would settle for" 3 
$5,000,000 exemption 113 -which, with inflation adjustment, is what 
Congress has now legislated. 1 i-1 
Professor Reginald Mombrun favors the estate tax "to prevem 
uncontrolled wealth accumulation. "115 While he favors the estate tax's role as 
a revenue raiser, as a repayment for the public services which help to create 
wealth, and as a backstop to the income tax, Professor Mombrum 's principal 
defense of the tax is that it "promotes equality of economic opportunities by 
I . . f I h ,,116 essenmg concentrations o wea t . 
I 08. Id. at xii. 
I 09. Joel C. Debris, Federal Transfer Taxes: The Possibility of Repeal and 
the Post Repeal World, 48 CLEV. Sr. L. REV. 709, 725 (2000) [hereinatler Dobris. 
Possibility of Repea[J. 
II0. Id. 
11 I. Id. at 7 l l. 
I 12. Id. at 725. 
113. Id. 
114. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(3) (defining "basic exclusion amount" as S5.000.000 
adjusted for inflation). 
l 15. Reginald Mombrun, let 's Protect Our Econo1111· and Democra(1fro111 
Paris Hilton: The Case for Keeping tht! Estate Tax, 33 01110 N.U. L. REV. 61, b3 
(2007). 
116. Id. at 98. 
• 
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In a similar vein, Professor Anne Alstott focuses " h 
l. · l · d . upon t e significa~\,Po 1t1ca , economic an social power that possession of wealth 
confers:" 
[P]rivate wealth remains a source of current social 
economic, and political power that goes beyond the potentiai 
use of wealth for consumption. In addition to the social and 
political influence that wealth creates, the possession of 
wealth confers significant economic security; one need not 
consume wealth to bask in its benefits. 118 
The federal estate tax, Professor Alstott argues, reduces inequality by 
"modestly curbing inheritance."119 
Professor Michael J. Graetz is skeptical of the federal estate tax as 
either a revenue raiser120 or as a device for eliminating great concentrations 
of inherited wealth.121 However, he supports the tax as "providing an 
important element of progressivity in the federal tax system."122 
Professor Edward J. McCaffery is an opponent of estate taxation 
who sympathizes with the underlying goals of the estate tax but who argues 
that the tax fails to implement those goals effectively:123 "[t]he gift and estate 
tax has long since ceased to be a major part of any compelling policy 
objective - such as, to name four, raising revenue, instilling progressivity 
into the tax system, 'backing up' the income tax, or breaking up large 
concentrations of wealth."124 
Though these objectives "are more pressing than ever,"125 the estate 
tax as adapted by Congress and approved by President Obama in 2012 "is 
now largely irrelevant" to these goals.126 It is accordingly time to abandon 
federal estate taxation and instead concentrate reformist energies on more 
1 1 7. Professor Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against lncome 
and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REv. 
363, 366 (1996). 
118. /d. at 371. 
119. Jd. at 375. 93 y 
120. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not To Bury It, ALE 
L. J. 259, 269 (I 983). 
121. Id. at 271. 
122.Jd.at270-73. . . b D't tion-
123. Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from D1stractt0n Y ,s rac · 
Reimagining Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235 (20l3). 
124. Id. at 1236. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
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Productive possibilities like "a carryover basis or a realization-on-d 
. ,,m eath 
regime. . . . . 
While Professor Ltly Batchelder 1s not as cnt1cal of the estate tax ,,x 
she nevertheless concludes that it would be better to replace the federal ' 
. . h . . 1 b . 1. estate tax with "a comprehensive m entance tax wit 1 a as1c 1fetime exem 1. 
. II ,,129 A · h . P ton 
and a small annual exemption as we . n m entance tax would "m 
· d h · .,130 h d ore fairly allocate econo1111~ bur ~ns a~ong . eirs. t an oes the estate tax 
while simultaneously 1mprovmg the incentives faced by donors d 
I . an hcirs"' 31 and reducing "the level of tax comp extty to some degree." '1~ 
Moreover Professor Batchelder argues, an inheritance tax would be mor 
' · iu Sh Id 1 · h · e transparent than 1s the estate tax. e wou coup e an m entance tax with 
· " . I . d t 134 carrvover basis ior rn 1ente asse s. 
, In contrast to those who criticize the estate tax while agreeing with 
the objectives underlying such a tax, others oppose the estate tax because 
inherited wealth should not be taxed. As Professors Graetz and Shapiro 
observe, 
those fighting to repeal the death tax are tapping into a few 
tenets widely felt by the American public: distaste for 
imposing a tax when the family's breadwinner dies; desire to 
mark one's success in life by building up wealth-a 
legacy-and passing it on to children or grandchildren; 
admiration of entrepreneurship, small businesses, and family 
fanns; and the inherent unfairness of"double taxation."u5 
Curtis S. Dubay of the Heritage Foundation advances this critique, 
arguing that the federal estate tax ''slows economic growth, destroys jobs, 
and suppresses wages because it is a tax on capital and on 
entrepreneurship."136 Like other opponents of the estate tax, Mr. Dubay 
emphasizes the hann the tax inflicts on family-owned businesses, contending 
that the tax "reduces the ability of family-owned businesses to expand, hire 
127. Id. at 1237. 
128. Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case 
for a Comprehensil'e Inheritance Tax, 63 TAX L. Ri::v. I, 68 (2009). 
129. Id. at 60. 




134. Id. at 88. 
135. MICIIAEL 1. GRAEl'l & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATII BY A THOUSAND CUTS: 
TIIE F!Glll OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 83 (2005 ). 
136. Curtis S. Dubay. The Econumic Case Against the Death Tax 24-rn 
IIE!ff!AGE FOUND. 8ACK(ifWI JNDER I, 2 (2010). • 
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new workers, and pay higher wages."137 This economic harm h 
. "ti d b h h , e assens, 
cannot be JUStt 1e y t e revenue t e estate tax raises "J·ust above 1 . ,,1Js , percent 
of total federal tax collections. Moreover, Mr. Dubay contends, the tax is 
not "necessary to prevent the accumulation of wealth in a limited few 
·1· ,,139 famt 1es. 
ln this vein, the Family Business Estate Tax Coalition (FBETC) 
favors "full, permanent repeal of the estate tax" because of the tax's impact 
on family-owned businesses. 14° Chief among FBETC's concerns is the 
illiquid nature of family businesses "which can force the new owner to sell 
the business's assets to pay the tax."141 Moreover, FBETC objects to the 
costs of the planning necessitated by the tax: "Planning costs associated with 
the estate tax are a drain on business resources, taking money away from day 
to day operations and business investment. These additional costs make it 
more difficult for the business owner to expand and create new jobs."142 
For the libertarian commentator Laurence M. Vance, economic 
concerns are secondary to the ethical objections to estate taxation: 
To the libertarian, the arguments against the estate tax all 
come down to liberty and property. It doesn't matter if "the 
rich" and his heirs can "afford it." The right of the deceased 
to dispose of his accumulated wealth - whether it is earned 
or "unearned" - is a natural and inviolable right. He may in 
fact wish to leave his entire fortune to the government to be 
redistributed as bureaucrats see fit. But that must be his 
decision, not the state's. Every American should have the 
liberty to dispose of his property - in life or in death - as he 
sees fit. 143 
In political terms, the debate has, until now, focused on whether 
there should be a federal estate tax. Thus, little attention has been devoted to 
the unlimited nature of the estate tax charitable deduction . However, the 
commendable success of the Giving Pledge now gives the deduction salience 
as the Pledge constitutes a systematic (albeit inadvertent) threat to the fed~ral 
estate tax base. As I suggest in the next section, the Giving Pledge requires 
137.ld.at3. 
138. Id. at 5. 
139.Id. 1· f (\ t 140. FAMILY Bus. ESTATE TAX COAL., http://www.estatetaxre ,e .org as 
accessed Sept. 26, 2014). 
141. Id. at About Us. 
! :t If.aurence M. Vance, A Libertarian View of the Estate Tax, THE 
FUTURE OF FREEDOM FOUND., (Dec. 6, 2010), http://fff.org/explore-freedom 
/article/libertarian-view-estate-tax. 
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limits on the estate tax charitable deduction to ensure that all large estates 
pay some estate tax. 
VI. THE ARGUMENT FOR LIMITING THE ESTATE TAX 
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION 
Against this background, I conclude that, in light of the laudable 
success of the Giving Pledge, the federal estate tax should be amended to 
restrict an estate's charitable deduction to a percentage of the estate, just as 
the income tax charitable deduction is limited to a percentage of the 
taxpayer's income. The limits on the income tax charitable deduction 
represent a sensible compromise among contending policies, a compromise 
which should be incorporated into the federal estate tax to ensure that every 
large estate pays some estate tax-even if such an estate is totally left to 
charity. 
A limit to the estate tax charitable deduction could take any of 
several forms. The ideal form would be the insertion into the federal estate 
tax of the bifurcated limits the Code today imposes on the income tax 
deductibility of charitable contributions. Alternatively, less robust 
restrictions could be fashioned for the estate tax such as a charitable 
deduction limit only applicable to bequests to private foundations or to 
certain private foundations. However, less hardy restrictions along these lines 
would still permit large estates to avoid federal estate taxation if such estates 
are devoted solely to public charities. 
It is sensible to encourage charitable bequests to maintain a vibrant 
charitable sector and to recognize for tax purposes that charitable bequests, 
in important respects, sacrifice personal resources by devoting them to public 
purposes. On the other hand, the selection of charitable donees is a 
consumption-like power. Charitable bequests, particularly to family-
controlled private foundations, can have a dynastic quality. Much, if not 
most, of the wealth of the Giving Pledgers (and other rich decedents) 
represents either unrealized appreciation never taxed under the Code or 
capital gain taxed at more favorable income tax rates than ordinary income. 
Death is the final opportunity for the federal fisc to obtain compensation 
from the deceased for the social overhead which helped to create his fortune. 
Permitting, but limiting, the estate tax charitable deduction would be a 
sensible compromise of these contending policies, as it is a sensible 
compromise in the context of the income tax to ensure that everyone pays 
some tax, even if they donate all of their income to charity. 
For the foreseeable future, the basic features of the federal estate tax 
will remain as they are today. There is currently little chance that the federal 
estate tax will be abolished or that it will be applied more broadly to smaller 
estates. A~ a result of the compromise reached by President Obama and 
Congress m 201 2, the Code now embodies the Gates-Volcker-Dobris vision 
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of an estate tax which exempts from death taxation what are sometimes 
called the "mass affiuent."
144 
The federal tax today reaches only the estates 
of individuals leaving over $5,000,000 adjusted for inflation.145 
While Presidents Reagan and Bush sought to abolish the estate tax 
paradoxically, the reforms _t~ey achieved saved the federal estate tax b; 
alleviating the strongest pohttcal pressures to abolish the tax. As a result of 
the unlimited marital deduction signed into law by President Reagan, 1~6 no 
estate tax is due when the first spouse dies. The increases in the unified credit 
initiated during the Bush Administration culminated in the exclusion from 
taxation of estates under $5,000,000 adjusted for inflation. 147 Thus, a total of 
$10,000,000 (inflation adjusted) can be left tax-free by a surviving spouse on 
his or her demise. 148 With the tax today falling exclusively on the largest 
estates when the surviving spouse dies, much of the political pressure to 
abolish the tax has been abated. 
In part because the estate tax is now focused exclusively on the 
largest estates, the revenue yield of the federal estate tax is modest compared 
to the enom1ous amounts generated by fiscal behemoths like the federal 
income and payroll taxes. The roughly $7 billion produced annually by the 
federal estate tax constitute a mere 0.3 percent of total federal tax 
revenues. 
149 On the other hand, the fortunes of the Giving Pledgers and their 
fellow billionaires are immense. Even without the obligatory reference to 
Everett Dirksen, 150 the federal estate tax raises funds in amounts which are 
144. Erik J. Greupner, Comment, Hedge Funds Are Headed Down-market: 
A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1555, 1573 (accepting the 
definition of the "mass affluent" as "those with a net worth between $1 million and 
$5 million"); Jacqueline Doherty, B of A's Biggest Bet Ever: Big Risks, and 
Rewards, BARRON'S, Sept. 22, 2008, at 27 (defining "mass affluent" as those "with 
assets of $100,000 to $3 million"). 
145. For 2014, the estate tax's inflation-adjusted "basic exclusion amount" 
is $5,340,000. Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537, § 3.32. 
146. Section 403(a)(l )(A) of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 
Pub.L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 amended section 2056 of the Code to eliminate the 
ceiling on the federal estate tax marital deduction. 
14 7. Section 20 I 0( c) provides the basic exclusion amount of $5,000,000 
increased by post-201 I inflation. I.R.C. § 2010(c). 
148. Section 2010(c)(4) facilitates estate planning by today permitting what 
is commonly called "portability," that is, the transfer of the first spouse's bas(c 
exclusion amount to the estate of the second spouse to die. I.R.C. § 2010(c)(4}. This 
permits the second spouse to leave a total of$ I 0,000,000 adjusted for inflation on 
his subsequent death. 
149. Jonathan Schwabish & Courtney Griffith, The U.S. Federal Budget, A 
Closer Look at Revenues, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, Apr. 17, 2012, http://www.cbo. 
gov/publication/43153. 
. I SO. For a thoughtful discussion of whether Senator Dirks_e~ actually mad~ 
his "billion here, billion there" comment, see "A Billion Here, A B,llwn There · · ·• 
420 Florida Tax Review [Vo!. 16:7 
significant to most of us, though the tax is now focused only on the ve 
~~- ry 
If the Giving Pledgers make good on their pledges (as I hope th 
do), significant revenue will be lost to the federal fisc as a result of t~y 
unlimited estate tax charitable deduction. Most Giving Pledgers will pa e 
neither income tax on the unrealized appreciation they accmed while aliv~ 
nor estate tax on that wealth when they bequeath it to charity. The Giving 
Pledge constitutes a systematic, albeit inadvertent, threat to the federal estate 
tax base. 
. . This brings us back to the question whether charitable donations, by 
G1vmg Pledgers or by other wealthy donors, represent consumption or 
sacrifice. The limits of the income tax charitable deduction have proved 
durable as a compromise reflecting the fact that charitable contributions have 
elements of both consumption and sacrifice. As a compromise, those limits 
provide tax incentives for giving while ensuring that an individual who 
donates her entire income to charity will pay some federal tax. 
On the one hand, a donor to charity exercises consumption-style 
choice when she designates a charitable donee. She may receive significant 
benefits from her donation including public recognition and the 
implementation of her personal priorities by the charity receiving her funds. 
Celebrity-style charity includes much self-promotion. 151 
The argument that charity is consumption is strongest in cases of 
donations to family-run private foundations. The family members who serve 
as trustees and officers of such a foundation can receive reasonable 
compensation for their work on the foundation's affairs with the foundation 
counting such compensation as part of its charitable outlays for purposes of 
the Code's five percent minimum distribution rule. 152 In addition, as 
Professor Miranda Perry Fleischer has observed, control of a private 
foundation entails economic and political power in terms of determining who 
will receive the foundation's largesse153 and where the foundation's 
endowment will be invested. 154 Moreover, she notes, "control of a charity 
THE DIRKSEN CONG. CTR., last updated Sept. 25, 2012, http://www.dirksencenter. 
org/print_ emd _ billionhere.htm. 
151. See, e.g., Max Chafkin, Sightseers On a Mission, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Aug. 11, 2013, at MM 18; MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, 
PHILANTIIROCAPITAUSM: How GIVING CAN SAVE THE WORLD 9 (2008) ("At least 
since the Live Aid concert in 1985, celebrities and philanthropy have become ever 
more entwined. Now, movie and rock star 'celanthropists' are serious partners with 
the supcrrich."). 
I 52. I.R.C. § 4942(g)(l )(A) (charitable distributions of private foundations 
include "reasonable and necessary administrative expenses"). 
153. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Chariiable Contrih11tiu11.1· in an Ideal Estate 
Tax, 60 TAX L. REV. 263, 286- 87 (2007). 
154. /cl. at 287. 
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Can bring with it prominence in a community and such . 
· · h ' prominence often brings with 1t power - muc the same way being a busin . 1 d brings with it indirect political power."155 ess ea er often 
To take one prominent case, Warren Buffett's ch'ld 
. · 1· · J d · · 1 ren exercise significant po tltca an economic influence by virtue f th , , ... 1.. • 
. . 156 h • , . o eJT 1<1u1er s 
cont:ibut1ons to t e pnvate 1oun~attons they control. Howard Buffett's 
charitable efforts come across as smcere and productive 1s1 U 1.k her 
. f h' h fi is • nr1 e ot well-known mstanccs o 1g pro tie charity, Howard Buffi tt' L- • 
'h h' h' , ·1 , . . e s Cu~nfy advances nett er 1s nor ts 1am, y s poltt1cal ambitions and ·15 d•----' . 159 con ""~ in 
an obviously thoughtful way. On the other hand, Mr. Buffett ids 
substan~ial economic and political influence as the head of his ;;:ate 
foundation. When Howard Buffett travels to Africa for his anti 1.. 
. k . 1 b -uurigcr 
efforts, he 1s ta en very senous Y y government and NGO officials.'so 
One wealthy philanthro~ist declined to join the Giving Pledge 
because the Pledge can be satisfied by creating and funding .. family-
' d . ,,161 s· h 
controll~d 1oun attons. . mce t e Pledge can be fulfilled through such 
found~ttons, Robert w;,,!'tlson reportedly told Bill Gates_ that the Pledge is 
"practically worthl~ss. I am not prepared to go th1s far in light of 
admirable efforts hke Howard Buffett's. It is, however, hard to denv that 
some, perhaps many, private foundations serve dynastic and self-pro~oting 
agendas. 
155. Id. at 290. 
156. William Alden, Buffett Gives $2 Billion to Gates Fol/11aation, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 8, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07 /08/buffett-gn es--2-
billion-to-gates-foundation (discussing contributions to the Susan and HO\\ard 
Buffett Foundations). 
157. See HOWARD G. BUFFETT, FORTY CHANCES: FrNDC-.G HOPE e. A 
HUNGRY WORLD (2013) [hereinafter BUFFETT, FORTY CHANCES}. 
158. See, e.g., Andrea Peyser, It's Chelsea Clinton's time, N.Y. POST, NO\ 
4, 2013, http://nypost.com/2013/l l/04/its-chelsea-c\inton-time (discussing the Bil~ 
Hillary & Chelsea Clinton Foundation); Maureen Do\\d, Isn't It Rich?, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 13, 2014, at SRI l (same). 
159. Cf Erin Carlyle, The Anti-Paris Hilton, FORBES, Dec. 2. :?013, at &6 
( discussing the charity of Liesel Pritzker Simmons). 
160. See, e.g., BUFFETT, FORTY CJ-W:ICES, supra note 157, at 74 (~We made 
arranoements to meet up with the United Nations World Food Programme (\\"FPI. 
which was working in the country. A friendly, capable country director named Dom 
and a driver named Douglas met me at the airport in Lilongwe, Mala\\i's main city 
and capital."). . 
161. Eleanor Goldberg, Major Philanthropist Refuses To Join Gato 
Charity Pledge Because II 's 'Praclically Worthless.' HUFF!NGTON Posr L"-\PACT. l:bt 
updated Jan. 25, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014 01/0:? robc!rt-\\ll:....n-
giving-pledge _ n _ 4531661.html. 
162. /d. 
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P ofessor Tan\'a D. Marsh argues that the boundaries established . r J bl' h . . h in 
1969 between private foundations and pu 1c c ant1es ave subsequently 
b , both over- and underinclusive.
163 The donor-advised funds operated 
el:ome · 1 · fi bv community foundations and by commerc1a investment 1rms, ~he argues, 
a;e effectirely private foundations (though th~ law does not classify them as 
h) while institutions like the Ford Foundation, no longer controlled by the sue .. 
founding family, are effectively public entities. 
Even if the Code's current distinction between public charity and 
private foundations is not perfect, it ~aptures an imp.ortant re.ality, namely, 
that family-controlled private foundations often entail fi?ancial benefit, as 
well as political, economic and social power, for the family controlling that 
foundation. In important respects, bequests to such foundations have 
consumption and dynastic qualities and represent wealth passed on to the 
donor's family, even when such family-controlled foundations do admirable 
work. If, as Professor Marsh suggests, Congress revises for income tax 
purposes the definition of a private foundation to reflect post-1969 
developments, that updated definition can be used for the estate tax as well. 
On the other hand, as Professors Andrews, Bittker, and Turnier 
argue, charity is different from other personal outlays because of the benefits 
charitable donations confer on others. Even when charitable donations reflect 
affluent tastes, for example, contributions to art museums and private 
schools, donors are sharing their wealth with others. Donations to museums 
and prep schools may have redistributive impact if, for example, such 
donations enable museums to adopt free admissions policies 164 or allow 
private schools to expand their scholarship programs for low-income 
students. 
To return to the example of the Buffett family members and their 
private foundations, the Buffetts are using their money differently and more 
admirably than are other billionaires who instead engage in what Professor 
Andrews dubbed "private, preclusive household consumption."165 
The limits on the income tax charitable deduction as framed in 1969 
have been stable because such limits strike a defensible balance amona these 
contending policies. This compromise should be emulated in the federal 
estate_ tax by limiting that tax's deduction for charitable bequests, 166 thereby 
ensuring that all large estates pay some estate tax, even if they devolve 
entirely to charity. 
. 163. T~ya D. Marsh, A Dubious Distinction: Rethinking Tax Treatment of 
Pnvate Foundatwns and Public Charities, 22 VA. TAX REV. ] 37 (2002). 
164. See, for example, the free general admission policy of The Walters Art 
Museum, last accessed Oct. I, 2014, http://thewalters.org. 
165. Andre_w~, P~rsonal Deductions, supra note 65 . 
. 166. Any_ hm1tat1on t~ the estate tax charitable deduction should also appl 
to the gift tax chantable deduction. y 
t 
2014] The B11.ffett-Gates Giving Pied e 
g 423 
Professor Bittker was skeptical of th 1 . should pay something.161 However that prem· e. c aim that every taxpayer 
d l . ' 1se 1s today dee l b the fe era mcome tax charitable deduction d h P Y em edded in 
to the estate tax charitable deduction If so an s i°uld now be carried over 
estate tax while the affluent would still hav~ ~~eI?' arg~ estate will pay some 
for charitable purposes. e incentive to bequeath wealth 
A limit on the estate tax charitable d d . 
l c Th e uctton could take a f severa 1orms. e best possibility is the whol 1 . . ny 0 income tax's charitable deduction limits into tehsa e incorporation of the 
, b . e estate tax Under th' 
approac11, equests to pubhc charities and qualify" (' · . is 
d · ) · mg 1.e., pass-thru active an supportmg pnvate foundations would be deducf b\ 50 ' ' 168 B I e up to percent of 
the estate. equests to all other private foundations wo ld b d d 'b 
to thirty percent of the estate. In this way the estate tax (ul"k teh ~ uctt le up 
ld b . . ' 1 e e income tax) wou , y grantmg the deduction, encourage charitable donat· t · · 
. . ions o rnamtam 
a vital chantable ~ector and woul~ also recognize that charity's public 
benefits make chantable bequests different from direct bequests to famil, 
m~b~. ) 
. S imult~neously, . limiting the deduction would recognize the 
competm~ cl~m1s: chantable contributions are, in important respects, 
consumpt1on-hke. Bequests to family foundations have a dynastic quality. 
Under current law, much wealth of the Giving Pledgers and their billionaire 
peers will, prior to death, never be taxed or will be taxed at lower capital gain 
rates. Death is the final opportunity for the federal fisc to obtain 
compensation from the affluent decedent for the social overhead which 
helped to create his fortune. Despite its commendable qualities, the Giving 
Pledge is a systematic, although unintended, threat to the estate tax base. 
A limit on the estate tax charitable deduction would reconcile the 
Buffett-Gates commitment to federal estate taxation (by guaranteeing that all 
large estates pay some estate tax) with the agenda of Buffett-Gates Giving 
Pledge (by incenting bequests to charity). 
An alternative attempt at such reconciliation might instead argue for 
estate taxation only for those who don't leave their w~a\th to cha~ity. 
Supporting this approach and an unlimited estate tax ~hantable _deduction, 
Bill and Melinda Gates can plausibly contend that thelf foundat~on spends 
their money for good causes more productively and more efficiently than 
would the federal government. From this vantage, the estate tax pr~ds the 
wealthy to give to charity, but should not be levied when wealth m fact 
devolves to charity. 
167. Bittker, Matching Grants, supra note 68d d by the marital deduction 
168. The limits would apply _10. the ~state re ~~: deductible under section 
of section 2056 and debts and admmistrat1ve expen 
2053. See I.R.C. §§ 2053, 2056. 
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However, as Bill Gates, Sr. persuasively asserts, 169 large fortu 
f h ~ . . nes and the owners o sue 1ortunes receive important public services fro 
inefficient federal government. Moreover, most of the Gates and Bm ~he 
fortunes consists of appreciated Microsoft and Berkshire-Hathaway sto ~ ett 
which the Gates and Buffett families will pay little or no federal income ton 
because they will never engage in a taxable sale. 170 If the Gates and B:ffcax 
families do not pay federal estate tax on this wealth, 171 they. will effectiv ~tt 
pay no fed~ral _tax at all-despite the public ~ontribution to that wea~ti 
eloquently h1ghhghted by Attorney Gates. There 1s a dynastic quality even t 
the most commendable of private foundations. And not all privai° 
foundations are so commendable. e 
Consider in this context a widowed172 Giving Pledger whose estate 
will consist of one billion dollars and who has paid no federal income tax on 
the unrealized appreciation of this fortune. Suppose further that this Giving 
Pledger plans to leave this entire amount to a private foundation controlled 
by his children. The Giving Pledger will pay no federal income tax on this 
appreciation while alive. Under current law, the Pledger's estate will 
subsequently bear no federal estate tax on his death since the entire billion 
dollars going to charity will be fully deductible for estate tax purposes. lf, 
instead, a 30 percent deduction limit applied to this bequest to his family's 
private foundation and if the federal estate tax rate remains at 40 percent, this 
estate will pay federal estate taxes of $280 million. 173 How might our 
theoretical Giving Pledger respond to this change of law? 
Perhaps not at all. He might still leave his entire estate to the private 
foundation controlled by his children except that, after the payment of 
federal estate taxes, this foundation would receive $720 million rather than 
the full one billion dollars. This outcome would constitute Professor Dobris's 
"little bite"174 since, in this scenario, the Pledger's children would still 
control a private foundation with formidable resources-though somewhat 
169. GATES SR. & COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH, supra 
note 97, at 110. 
170. Federal income tax is only imposed if there is a "sale or other 
disposition of property." I.R.C. §§ 6l(a)(3), I00l(a), (c). . 
171. Again, in this context, the reference to the estate tax includes the 
federal gift tax as well. 
172. A Giving Pledger who leaves a surviving spouse might prefer to leave 
her assets to her surviving spouse pursuant to the unlimited estate tax marital 
deduction and instead have the surviving spouse make the ultimate bequest to 
charity. I.R.C. § 2056 (estate tax marital deduction). . 
173. 30 percent of the one billion dollars going to charity will be de?uct1ble, 
leaving a net taxable estate of $700 million. At the 40 percent bracket, this would 
produce tax of $280 million. 
174. Dobris, Possibility of Repeal, supra note I 09, at 71 I. 
2014} The Buffett-Gates Giving Pledge 425 
less resources than if the full donation were deductible for estate tax 
purposes. 
Alternatively, this Giving Pledger now confronted wi·th a t t 





capped ldikedthe_ mcome tax charitable deduction, might 
seek to obtam t . ebl' perhce~t e u~tton for his estate, either by switching his 
bequest to a pu 1c c anty which qualifies for the higher 50 
· 1· · b d'fy• . . percent ded~ct1on ~mtt or y mo 1 mg his family foundation to qualify for that 
limit. ln either case, the federal estate tax would be reduced to $200 
million.175 
A third possible response is that, confronted with a restricted estate 
tax charitabl_e deduction, ~his Givin~ Pledger will donate to charity only 
amounts _which are de~ucttbl~ and will leave the remainder of his post-tax 
estate duectly to his family. Yet other possible responses include 
bequeathing to the family foundation the maximum deductible amount of 
$300 million, imparting to public charities the additionally deductible 
amount of $200 million, and passing to the children the $300 million 
remaining after the payment of federal estate taxes of $200 million. 
We cannot predict the response of any particular Giving Pledger (or 
of any other wealthy individual) to a federal estate charitable deduction 
limited along the lines of the income tax charitable deduction. We can, 
however, predict that, as a result of these limits, federal revenues will be 
greater and the amount received by the charities will be less. 1n simplest 
terms, that change would impart to the estate tax the same compromise 
embodied in the income tax, namely, to incent charitable giving (particularly 
to public charities and qualifying private foundations) while ensuring that 
every large estate pays some tax, even if it devolves entirely to charity. 
Instead of incorporating into the estate tax the charitable deduction 
limits of the income tax, a different limit might be fashioned for the estate 
tax. For example, bequests to public charities could remain estate tax 
deductible in full while bequests to private foundations would be subject to a 
deduction cap of 30 percent or SO percent of the estate. By limiting the 
deductibility only of bequests to private foundations, such a cap would 
acknowledge the dynastic qualities of such foundations while more strongly 
encouraging bequests to public charities through an unlimited deduction. 
This approach would have the benefit of neu~lizin~ the political 
opposition of public charities. Public charities, ~ ~0~1dable interest group, 
will oppose restrictions on the estate tax deducttb1hty of _bequests to them. 
However public charities might be indifferent to (or might perhaps even 
favor) ceilings which only cap the estate tax deductibilit~ of amounts sent to 
their competitors for donors' dollars (i.e., private foundations.) 
175 Fifty percent of the billion dollars going to charity will be de?uctible, 
leaving a ne~ taxable estate of $500 million. At the 40 percent bracket, lhis would 
produce tax of $200 million. 
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Limiting the estate tax deduction only for contrib t· 
fi d · Id • . u ions to p . oun at1ons wou continue to permit large estates to a .d nvate 
· 'f h d I · I voi any e t taxation I t ey evo ve entire y to public charities. A second d' d sate 
h. h · h · Id · · · tsa Vantag t 1s approac ts t at 1t wou , via a limited estate tax deductio fi e of 
to all private foundations, treat the same way both donation or bequests 
admirable private foundations, like the Gates and Buffett fou~~ tt? wholly 
d · I d · · · a tons and onauons to ess eserving pnvate foundations. While I think ' 
kn h I h 176 most of u ow t e atter w en we see them, I see no administrabl s 
distinguishing in statutory language "good" private foundations wh~c;ay of 
their funds productively and efficiently from their less adm~pebnd 
. 1ra le 
counterparts. Thus, under this approach, all bequests to all p • 
foundations would be subject to the same estate tax deduction limit. nvate 
A third possible version of the estate tax charitable deduction Ii • 
would leave unrestricted the deduction for bequests to public charities and~tt 
private foundations qualifying for the higher income tax deduction limit tha~ 
. h . d . ;.'. d . in . ' 1s, pass-t ru, operating, an supporting 1oun at1ons. The celling on estate 
tax charitable deductions would thus apply only to nonqualifying private 
foundations currently subject to the lower, 30 percent income tax deduction 
limit. 178 These are the foundations most prone to dynastic accumulations in 
the hands of the decedent's family since these nonqualifying foundations do 
not pass through their resources, do not conduct active operations, and do not 
support public charities. 
Under this alternative also, federal estate tax would be totally , 
avoidable if an estate were to be bequeathed in its entirety to public charities 
or to qualifying private foundations. Such an alternative would, however, 
improve current law by getting more estates to pay some estate tax. Such an 
approach would also provide the strongest tax incentives for bequests to the 
public charities and qualifying private foundations for whom the estate tax 
charitable deduction would remain uncapped. 
Like all compromises, none of these alternatives will satisfy those 
who occupy the polar positions. A libertarian ethically opposed to estate 
taxation will logically reject any limit on the estate tax charitable deduction 
as reinforcing the burden of an illegitimate tax. Similarly, no limit on the 
estate tax charitable deduction will appeal to those who see nothing different 
between charity and other outlays and who disapprove of the use the estate 
tax to encourage charitable legacies. However, for those who view the 
]imitations of the income tax charitable deduction as a plausible and durable 
176. Nathaniel Zelinsky, Fifty Years of ·•1 know it when I see ii, " 
CONCURRING OPINIONS, June 19, 2014, http://www.concurringopinions.com/ 
archives/a uthor/nathaniel-zelinsky. . 
177. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
I 78. See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
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compromise among contendi~g ~onsiderations, the same or a similar 
compromise should be compellmg m the context of the estate tax. 
If t~at is not a progra_m which wil! lead legions to the political 
barricades, 1t does reflect a sensible compromise among contending conce 
and would align_ the p~licy of t~e income tax (which currently lim~ 
charitable deductions) with the pohcy of the estate tax (which today does 
not). 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Giving Pledge, an admirable effort to channel wealth to charity, 
requires us to confront the paradox that the federal estate tax charitable 
deduction is unlimited while the federal income tax charitable deduction is 
capped. In light of the commendable success of the Giving Pledge, we 
should revisit this paradox. If a Giving Pledger makes good on his 
commitment to leave his wealth to charity, the federal fisc losses significant 
revenue since the Pledger thereby avoids federal estate taxation as charitable 
bequests are deductible without limit for federal estate tax purposes. Despite 
its laudable qualities, the Giving Pledge is a systematic (albeit inadvertent) 
threat to the estate tax base. 
The Giving Pledge requires the amendment of the federal estate tax 
to restrict an estate's charitable deduction to a percentage of the estate, just 
as the income tax charitable deduction is limited to a percentage of the 
taxpayer's income. In this fashion, the sensible compromise embedded in the 
income tax charitable deduction would be carried over to the federal estate 
tax to simultaneously encourage charitable giving while ensuring that all 
large estates pay some federal estate tax. 
The Giving Pledge need not be the death knell of the federal estate 
tax. It should instead be the catalyst to refonn the tax by limiting the estate 
tax charitable deduction. 
